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The Distant Promise of a  
Negotiated Justice
Leslie Vinjamuri
Abstract: A basic dilemma for political transitions and peace talks, whether to hold perpetrators of mass 
atrocities accountable or to negotiate a deal, has once again become the source of intense political con-
troversy. Originally seen as containing a pathbreaking and innovative solution to this problem, a peace 
deal designed to bring an end to the war between the government of Colombia and the FARC was in-
strumentalized by former President Uribe to mobilize popular support and was struck down when it was 
put to the public for a vote. Elsewhere, political realities have impinged on efforts to hold trials, provok-
ing a backlash by powerful individuals determined to spoil the peace rather than sacrifice their personal 
freedom. But when international criminal tribunals fail to prosecute powerful spoilers, they have been con-
demned for their hypocrisy or charged with being selective in their pursuit of justice. One measure to address 
the basic accountability dilemma would be to accept transitional justice compromises that hold a rea-
sonable prospect of delivering peace and that have a strong base of support among those individuals and 
communities most affected by political violence. Transitional justice strategies should be guided by a do-
no-harm principle.
Fourteen years ago, in the pages of this journal, Jack 
Goldsmith and Stephen Krasner wrote about the lim-
its of an idealism that would disassociate the search 
for justice from sovereignty, national security, and 
power politics.1 In that same year, Jack Snyder and 
I wrote that holding war crime trials in states with 
powerful spoilers and weak institutions risked pro-
voking a backlash.2 These warnings, grounded in a 
logic that stressed the consequences of political ac-
tion, built on the work of Samuel Huntington, who, 
in his book Third Wave, identified the potential for 
a backlash if war crimes trials were held in coun-
tries where the military retained significant power.3 
Despite these cautionary notes, the effort to build 
and consolidate institutions around a rules-based log-
ic designed to secure the prospect of criminal account-
ability for international crimes has forged ahead: 
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many of the rules and procedures that gov-
ern the International Criminal Court (icc) 
have been formalized; important principles 
such as complementarity and the interests 
of justice have been given more clarity; and 
practices for guiding preliminary examina-
tions have been formalized. Since 2002, the 
Court has opened ten formal investigations 
(“situations”), and begun at least as many 
preliminary investigations. It has publicly 
issued thirty-nine arrest warrants or sum-
monses to appear (and potentially more un-
der seal), including against heads of state. 
Far beyond the remit of the icc, the tide of 
justice has also been rising. Legal challeng-
es against high profile amnesties in Latin 
America succeeded, opening the door to 
human rights trials for atrocities commit-
ted under military dictatorships in Argen-
tina and Chile. Mixed and ad hoc tribunals 
have also contributed to what leading hu-
man rights scholar Kathryn Sikkink has 
called a “justice cascade.”4
The icc has played a critical role in al-
tering expectations for international jus-
tice among elites, civil society organiza-
tions, and the perpetrators of mass atroc-
ities, even in highly unstable and violent 
contexts. Peace negotiators and interna-
tional diplomats think differently about 
peace talks today than they did two de-
cades ago. Formal amnesties that explic-
itly refer to international crimes are now 
widely acknowledged to be off the table.
 There has also been considerable effort 
to clarify formal rules governing possible 
exceptions to icc justice, namely those 
pertaining to deferrals, complementarity, 
and the decision to abstain from proceed-
ings if they do not serve the interests of jus-
tice. Once merely words on a piece of pa-
per, these rules have received considerable 
attention.5 Rather than making exceptions 
on an ad hoc basis, the icc has sought to 
design rules to govern exceptions. 
Some of these rules are based on a logic 
of consequences. The Security Council can 
defer a case for a twelve-month (renew-
able) period if it agrees there is a threat to 
peace and security. But most of the rules 
that the icc draws on to govern exceptions 
follow a different logic. Consequentialism 
doesn’t underpin the complementarity 
principle, which dictates that the icc will 
only consider cases when a country is not 
willing or able to hold individual perpetra-
tors accountable at home. The icc can also 
decide that a case is inadmissible if it is not 
in the interests of justice to pursue it. The 
“interests of justice” have been interpret-
ed to refer to the interests of victims, not 
the consequences for peace. But the mean-
ing of the interests of justice remains the 
source of considerable debate. Some argue 
that this should include a consideration 
of the interests of society at large, which 
would provide one route for the prosecu-
tor’s office to formally consider the impact 
of justice on peace. 
One result of the effort to further clarify 
and confirm the rules has been to narrow 
the scope for exceptions to be granted. The 
bar for sidestepping international justice is 
now far higher. To some, it may seem that 
little if any room has been left for compro-
mise and negotiation in the face of diffi-
cult trade-offs. 
This sea change in the institutions, laws, 
and rules designed to ensure accountabil-
ity has yet to produce similar changes on 
the ground. The gap between principle and 
practice is pronounced. Enforcement and 
compliance are subject to politics, pow-
er, and sovereignty.6 Public officials have 
proved reluctant to subject themselves 
to international scrutiny. Liberal democ-
racies, where the rule of law and human 
rights principles are well established, may 
support international justice for others, but 
prefer to deal with accountability issues at 
home. After the United States was report-
ed to have bombed a hospital in Afghani-
stan populated by Médecins sans Frontières 
(msf) workers and civilians, msf demand-
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ed that an international commission con-
duct investigations.7 Instead, the Penta-
gon proceeded with an internal investiga-
tion.8 When domestic procedures fall short 
of international expectations, democracies 
have asserted their sovereignty. The United 
States deflected international and domestic 
demands for trials of individuals responsi-
ble for the cia’s torture program.9 In 2014, 
the Senate conducted a formal investiga-
tion of the program resulting in the publi-
cation of a report, but there has been little 
follow-up since.10 
Elsewhere, a backlash against interna-
tional efforts to investigate state elites has 
taken root. The decision by South Africa 
to withdraw from the icc came within 
months of a visit by the President of Su-
dan. During this visit, South Africa came 
under intense pressure to send President 
Bashir to The Hague and was condemned 
for refusing to do so. Nonstate actors that 
cooperate with investigators and tribunal 
officials have risked their personal and 
organizational security. Refugees that co-
operated with the icc’s investigations of 
Darfur also found themselves to be at risk 
of personal danger. Humanitarian ngos 
that cooperated with the icc’s investiga-
tions of atrocities in Darfur were expelled. 
Similarly, witnesses that were called to the 
icc from Kenya were intimidated. State 
elites also waged an aggressive campaign 
against the Court. Kenya’s elites put up the 
fiercest protests of all, successfully forg-
ing a cross-ethnic alliance designed to se-
cure the presidency on the back of an anti- 
icc campaign. They then proceeded to 
build a cross-Africa protest coalition us-
ing the vehicle of the African Union to pro-
test against the icc’s targeting of sitting 
heads of state.
The impasse between principle and pol-
itics has created a political environment 
marked by uncertainty. Although the icc 
has formalized rules to govern exceptions, 
exceptions to the rules have, in practice, 
more often been driven by politics that take 
place beyond the icc. In many cases, the 
ability of spoilers to block the icc’s efforts 
to conduct investigations and to prevent 
arrests has been the ticket to a free pass. 
This political reality raises a crucial ques-
tion: are there circumstances under which 
transitional justice deals should be accept-
ed for principled and pragmatic reasons, 
and if there are, who should decide this? 
The announcement of a peace deal be-
tween farc rebels and the government 
of Colombia brought this dilemma to the 
fore.11 The arrangement turned on the ne-
gotiation of a transitional justice deal, the 
“special jurisdiction for peace.” farc reb-
els would be offered lighter sentences, in-
cluding an element of community service, 
in exchange for a confession of their wrong-
doings. The Colombian deal was subject to 
three checks: the Constitutional Court, a 
public referendum, and the International 
Criminal Court. Colombia had been under 
preliminary examination by the icc since 
2006. Ultimately, it was electoral politics 
and a national plebiscite, not the icc, that 
jettisoned the deal. 
 In this essay, I demonstrate how a back-
lash against international justice has creat-
ed a gap between principles and practice. 
Powerful state actors have sought to limit 
the scope of justice, sometimes by rewrit-
ing the rules or seeking to displace the au-
thority of existing institutions with al-
ternatives that they can more effectively 
control. Sequencing and negotiation are 
two frameworks that have shaped think-
ing about how to address this dilemma. Se-
quencing proposals assume that the tim-
ing and phasing of peace and justice strat-
egies can help resolve the tension between 
principle and practice, in part by helping 
to overcome the tension between secur-
ing peace and promoting justice. A second 
framework stresses the importance of ne-
gotiating transitional justice deals. One 
key question in considering these frame-
146 (1)  Winter 2017 103
Leslie  
Vinjamuri
works is what ethical standards should be 
used to determine the role for justice and 
accountability in any given situation. 
I advance three arguments about the op-
timal role of investigations and war crimes 
trials in transitional contexts. First, a do-
no-harm principle should guide decisions 
about justice and accountability, especial-
ly in transitional contexts. Second, propos-
als that recognize the need for compromise 
must not be ruled out. Sequencing is an in-
adequate framework for dealing with the 
need for justice and accountability in tran-
sitional contexts because it emphasizes the 
need to adjust the timing of established 
frameworks, but not the content. In fact, 
compromise on the substance and form 
of justice and accountability measures is 
often necessary. Third, the international 
community and especially the icc should 
recognize the legitimacy of transitional 
justice compromises, especially when do-
mestic support for these deals extends be-
yond their direct beneficiaries to include 
those most affected by political violence.
Historically, trials have been rare and, 
until recently, the assumption that peace 
must precede the pursuit of justice and that 
victorious powers would determine the 
course of justice has been unchallenged. 
Political elites also preferred to defer jus-
tice until after war’s end to prevent a pos-
sible retaliation against their own prison-
ers of war.12 Political considerations have 
also shaped the trajectory of ongoing jus-
tice initiatives. After 1945, American lead-
ers were determined to build a strong mul-
tilateral alliance system with Western Eu-
rope to counter Soviet power. Over time, 
American leaders feared that antagoniz-
ing West Germany would undermine their 
broader strategic objectives. By the mid-
1950s, the United States concluded its trials 
of German war criminals and put in place a 
clemency program that led to the early re-
lease of large numbers of them.13
Elites facing internal political transi-
tions have made similar calculations. Tran-
sitions away from authoritarianism have 
rarely included trials of high-ranking of-
ficials. In Brazil, an amnesty was used to 
secure the military’s buy-in as part of the 
transition. Argentina quickly backtracked 
after an initial attempt to put military lead-
ers on trial. To prevent a military coup, it 
too adopted an amnesty.14 General Pino-
chet approved his own amnesty as part of 
Chile’s transition away from military rule. 
Amnesty also has a long history through-
out Africa.15 Even in South Africa, where 
the truth and reconciliation commission 
quickly gained global recognition, the tran-
sition hinged on a deal that the Amnesty 
Committee was obliged to grant amnesty 
if certain criteria were fulfilled, most espe-
cially that an individual perpetrator con-
fessed his crimes, including a full disclo-
sure of all relevant facts. 
Transitions in Latin America spurred 
new legal thinking. The idea that there was 
a moral and legal duty to prosecute certain 
international crimes regardless of the con-
straints of sovereignty, conflict, or politi-
cal transition quickly gained traction.16 In 
the summer of 1992, war crimes in the Bal-
kans, and especially the discovery of de-
tention camps, inspired a coalition of jour-
nalists and human rights advocates to de-
mand prosecutions for the perpetrators of 
these mass atrocities.17 
In the spring of 1993, the United Nations 
Security Council passed a resolution to 
create the International Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (icty) to prosecute in-
ternational crimes in the former Yugosla-
via. One year later, a similar ad hoc tribu-
nal was created to prosecute perpetrators 
of the atrocities in the Rwandan genocide. 
By 1998, the Rome Statute created the ba-
sis for an institutionalized set of rules and 
procedures for criminal accountability and 
within a few years, the icc had received 
the necessary sixty ratifications. In 2002, it 
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became the first permanent international 
war crimes court. 
The surge of advocacy and institutions 
for accountability signaled a principled 
commitment to justice by a highly moti-
vated and mobilized network of advocates 
in both the private and public sphere that 
extended across many states, predomi-
nantly but not exclusively in Europe, Lat-
in America, and North America. Advocates 
have been optimistic that this would have 
positive effects for justice, accountability, 
and even peace. Perhaps the most enthu-
siastic and optimistic of the leading inter-
national ngos, Human Rights Watch, has 
argued for the power of arrest warrants and 
trials to stigmatize targeted individuals.18 
But the surge in principled advocacy has 
not been matched by a change in political 
realities. Consequently, the gap between 
principle and practice has widened. In the 
1990s, the use of amnesty increased as did 
the number of civil wars, many of which 
were resolved through negotiation rath-
er than military victories on the battle-
field.19 Increasingly, though, internation-
al peace negotiators now opt for a “stra-
tegic silence” in peace talks and peace 
agreements. The normative prohibition 
on amnesties has created a precarious bal-
ance between justice and peace. Amnesties 
for international crimes (genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes) are less 
common, but this has not translated into a 
commitment by belligerents to cooperate 
in prosecuting these crimes.20 
In the face of concrete justice initiatives, 
the targets of international justice have 
sought to deflect or reject investigations or 
arrests from taking place inside their bor-
ders. Even when governments have formal-
ly agreed to cooperate with the icc, their 
actual behavior has sometimes oscillated. 
Uganda invited the icc to investigate war 
crimes committed by Lord’s Resistance 
Army (lra) rebels, but with the caveat 
that it would not cooperate with icc pro-
ceedings against state actors.21 When faced 
with the quandary that icc arrest warrants 
might impede the success of peace talks in 
Juba, the government did an about-face, as-
serting that it preferred that the Court drop 
its case and allow talks with the lra to pro-
ceed unhindered.22 
One of the most commonly cited success 
stories for justice intervention is the case 
of Charles Taylor, former president of Li-
beria. An arrest warrant against Taylor is-
sued by the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
was unsealed on the first day of peace talks 
on the Liberian war. Taylor left the peace 
talks and was later prosecuted and convict-
ed for war crimes at a trial in The Hague. But 
although Taylor left the peace talks, what 
is usually left out of this story are the cir-
cumstances under which he agreed to go. 
Taylor left not with the assumption that he 
would be prosecuted, but rather under the 
belief that he would be protected. After re-
turning to Monrovia, he later went to Nige-
ria for what was intimated to him to be an 
indefinite asylum.23 Taylor’s trial and sub-
sequent conviction most likely made other 
leaders wary and less willing to step aside 
when faced with the prospect of an arrest.24 
The backlash against international jus-
tice has been especially intense in those 
places where the icc was never welcome in 
the first place. Security Council referrals of 
nonmembers have not been well received. 
Nor have investigations initiated by the 
prosecutor, as Kenya has shown. In these 
situations, uncompromising justice meted 
out against powerful spoilers has neither 
neutralized its targets nor weakened the 
resolve of their allies. Elites that have come 
under the purview of the icc have adopted 
an array of tactics designed to court allies 
and undermine investigations. Sudan’s 
President Bashir decided to stand for re-
election when he learned that there was an 
arrest warrant against him, effectively jet-
tisoning his previous plan to retire.25 First, 
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though, he forced the exit of leading inter-
national humanitarian organizations that 
he suspected of assisting icc investigators 
by giving evidence against him. The arrest 
warrant against Libya’s leader, Muammar 
Gadaffi, also failed to diminish his deter-
mination to fight. At the same time, the 
one-sided nature of icc investigations in 
Libya may have bolstered the confidence 
of rebel fighters whose crimes were effec-
tively ignored by the Court.26 
In Kenya, the icc had an even greater im-
pact, effectively inspiring two of its targets 
to form a coalition and campaign for the 
presidency on an anti-icc platform. The 
Kenyatta-Ruto campaign cast the icc as an 
instrument of Western imperialism, mak-
ing the icc one of the key election issues. 
After successfully taking the presidency and 
vice presidency, Kenyatta and Ruto went on 
to challenge the legitimacy of the icc and 
undermine its case against them, primari-
ly by intimidating witnesses. This strategy 
worked. In December 2014, Chief Prosecu-
tor Bensouda declared that the icc lacked 
sufficient evidence and so could not proceed 
with the case against President Kenyatta.
States have also been reluctant to sup-
port justice in the absence of either a tran-
sition plan or successful peace talks. For a 
full year, the U.S. government refused to 
support a call by European leaders to re-
fer Syria to the icc. European leaders had 
committed to a unified effort, but private-
ly, some European governments acknowl-
edged that they took comfort knowing 
they could name and shame Syria and talk 
about justice, but be secure in the reality 
that in the absence of U.S. support, peace 
diplomacy could proceed without risk of 
interference. The U.S. position changed 
only after a second round of peace talks 
failed. The release of photographic ev-
idence documenting mass atrocities in 
Syria spurred the U.S. government to sup-
port a French-led initiative to draft a reso-
lution calling for Syria’s referral to the icc. 
The resolution was vetoed by Russia and 
China.
One strategy to move beyond this im-
passe is to agree to a set of rules or ide-
als for closing the gap between principle 
and practice. This raises a prior question: 
what is the ethical standard for agreeing to 
such a principle? I recommend that a do-
no-harm standard should guide decisions 
about international justice. In the contem-
porary political, legal, and normative en-
vironment, this standard balances what 
is practically achievable with optimal re-
sults. By this standard, the pursuit of jus-
tice should not impede the prospects for 
achieving peace. Compromises of justice 
intended to save lives by ending war are ac-
ceptable. Similarly, amnesty would be ac-
ceptable if it helps secure a democratic tran-
sition, away from authoritarian rule that 
is associated with human rights abuses. 
In practice, the application of a do-no-
harm standard might guard against unen-
forceable arrest warrants targeted against 
powerful spoilers, especially sitting heads 
of state, but it would not preclude efforts 
to collect evidence and document crimes 
either by ngos like the Commission for 
International Justice and Accountability, 
by the un Commission of Inquiry, which 
has documented human rights abuses in 
states such as North Korea, or by the In-
ternational Criminal Court.27 
Positive effects, a second possible stan-
dard, sets a higher bar. By this standard, 
justice should be pursued only when it will 
have positive effects for peace, democracy, 
and human rights.28 A positive effects stan-
dard would consider the immediate impact 
on a particular situation, but also balance 
this with the medium- and long-term ef-
fects of justice and accountability. One po-
tentially positive effect of trading off jus-
tice in the short-term might be to secure 
a peace deal that empowers a reform coa-
lition’s institution-building efforts in the 
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long run. In an ideal world, the threat to 
prosecute and the promise to strike a tran-
sitional justice deal would be harnessed as 
part of a transitional strategy. In the exist-
ing normative, legal, and institutional en-
vironment, applying this standard is more 
difficult than it used to be, but still possi-
ble. For many observers, Colombia’s peace 
deal seemed to strike an important com-
promise, inserting accountability into the 
peace process but accepting a deal that of-
fered the prospect of ending a war that had 
run for more than fifty years.
A third standard, last resort, requires 
that all alternative policy instruments be 
deployed to avoid the resort to war (or to 
bring a halt to the continuation of war). 
This would include amnesties or safe ex-
its. A promise of amnesty could be paired 
with a threat to prosecute if perpetrators 
failed to abandon their war-fighting aims. 
If the strategic use of amnesty or safe exits 
fails to secure peace, then a last resort stan-
dard would allow for the pursuit of justice 
regardless the consequences. In the after-
math of the second round of failed peace 
talks at Geneva, and prompted by the re-
lease of photographic evidence document-
ing mass atrocities in Syria, the United 
States decided to back a French-led initia-
tive to draft a resolution calling for Syria’s 
referral to the icc.29 
If an offer of amnesty enabled peace, 
though, a last resort standard would per-
mit this exception. But if a safe exit were as 
likely to secure peace as an amnesty, then 
this would be preferable on moral as well as 
legal grounds. Unlike an amnesty, a safe exit 
offers no formal legal protection, but it has 
a similar ability to solve a short-term politi-
cal problem by removing powerful spoilers. 
Human rights advocates accept the prac-
tice of safe exits, but have rejected amnesty 
for international crimes. During the nato 
bombing of Libya, former President of the 
Open Society Foundations Aryeh Neier 
suggested the possibility of a safe exit deal 
for Gaddafi, but rejected offering amnes-
ty.30 In 2015, four years after the war in Syr-
ia began, Kenneth Roth, director of Human 
Rights Watch, argued that while amnesty 
must remain off the table, a safe exit could 
be arranged for Assad.31 
In practice, the last resort standard will 
be difficult to implement. Policy instru-
ments, like an amnesty or safe exit, that fail 
to work at one point may be successful at 
a later point when the facts on the ground 
change. Peace talks failed in Bosnia in 1993, 
but succeeded in 1995. If an arrest warrant 
against Milosevic had been issued in 1993 
on the basis that it was a last resort, this may 
have undermined the success of the peace 
talks, in which Milosevic represented the 
Serbs and that resulted in the signing of the 
1995 Dayton peace accords. 
In the case of Syria, if the proposed Secu-
rity Council Resolution had passed, this may 
have added an additional complication to ef-
forts to deal with the conflict in Syria. With-
in months of this vote, the U.S. focus shifted 
to combatting the rise of the Islamic State. 
And in late September 2015, Russia entered 
the war as an ally of President Assad.
In recent years, practitioners, advocates, 
and scholars have debated the optimal se-
quencing of international justice. This de-
bate gained momentum surrounding the 
intervention in Libya. The juxtaposition of 
a Security Council referral of Libya to the 
icc and, weeks later, nato’s military in-
tervention instigated intense debate and 
division among human rights organiza-
tions about the role of the icc in ongo-
ing conflict. The icc’s role in Libya, espe-
cially its decision to issue an arrest war-
rant against Gaddaffi during nato’s air 
campaign, once again raised the question 
whether the threat to prosecute had a sub-
stantially negative effect on efforts to end 
the fighting. The African Union felt its own 
efforts to negotiate a settlement were ham-
pered by the icc arrest warrant. The de-
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cision by the icc not to investigate rebel 
crimes was seen by some analysts as alter-
ing the dynamics of the conflict by em-
boldening rebel fighters.32 
Sequencing proposals fall into three 
broad categories. First, proponents of a 
rights-first strategy call for integrating hu-
man rights and justice concerns into the 
front line of peace and security diplomacy 
and humanitarian initiatives. This strate-
gy embodies a critique of the pragmatism 
of negotiations or humanitarian initiatives 
that have either taken human rights con-
cerns off the table to secure access or ne-
gotiate a deal, or deferred them until peace 
and security goals are achieved. 
Second, peace-first proposals essential-
ly recommend that human rights and ac-
countability concerns be deferred un-
til peace has been secured either through 
the use of military force or through nego-
tiations. Historically, amnesty has been an 
instrument that is integral to the peace-
first approach. More recently, because of 
the normative prohibition against amnesty 
for genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
war crimes, negotiators have generally ad-
opted either a “strategic silence” for inter-
national crimes, or an amnesty that in the-
ory does not apply to international crimes, 
but in practice might. 
Third, separate tracks– the antisequenc-
ing proposal –rejects a focus on the strate-
gic consequences of investments in peace 
and justice. Louise Arbour, former chief 
prosecutor of the icty and former high 
commissioner for human rights at the Unit-
ed Nations, coined this term after nato’s 
war in Libya had ended. In a speech during 
her tenure as president of Crisis Group, Ar-
bour called for separate tracks arguing that 
the inevitable conflicts that arose between 
separate tracks should be resolved through 
ongoing compromise.33 Justice proponents 
and practitioners must not make excep-
tions in order to achieve peace and, simi-
larly, peace practitioners must set aside any 
consideration of how their efforts will af-
fect the prospects for justice. Only when 
the trade-offs are inevitable should they 
be negotiated, although proponents of this 
view have given few guidelines for how to 
approach these trade-offs. International 
justice and peace talks are two separate 
tracks that must be pursued independent-
ly and without consideration of the other. 
Separate tracks rejects a strategic approach 
to the pursuit of justice whereby threats to 
investigate or prosecute are matched by a 
promise of a safe exit or even amnesty if 
perpetrators of atrocities agree to stop 
fighting. It calls for preserving the inde-
pendence of international tribunals from 
political influence both in practice and in 
institutional form. 
Sequencing proposals are primarily con-
cerned with timing and give inadequate 
consideration to the need for compro-
mise and for deals. For this reason, they 
are ultimately inadequate for dealing with 
the real challenge of transitional justice. 
In many cases, the more preferable deals 
consist of arrangements that are outside 
the bounds of narrowly conceived crimi-
nal justice standards. Still, three proposals 
in particular should be given serious con-
sideration. 
First, since the likelihood of bringing 
perpetrators to justice and securing a con-
viction during ongoing violent conflict is 
low, while the prospect that trials can de-
rail peace talks is significant, the focus in 
this period should be limited to evidence 
collection. Ideally, this evidence should be 
collected in a fashion that allows it to be 
useable in trials, should these be pursued 
at a later date. Commissions that are estab-
lished to collect facts should be given suffi-
cient time to complete their work. 
Second, preliminary examinations by the 
icc have the potential to cast the shadow of 
justice on violent conflict situations. Ide-
ally, such investigations should help steer 
parties toward a resolution of conflict that 
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recognizes a role for accountability that is 
stabilizing and acceptable to the relevant 
parties. However, the utility of preliminary 
examinations will necessarily be qualified 
by a number of factors, including the tim-
ing and nature of the communications that 
the icc delivers to relevant parties to peace 
talks, the timing of decisions about whether 
to proceed with formal investigations, and 
the criteria through which ultimate deci-
sions are made on final arrangements. Pre-
liminary examinations are potentially very 
significant beyond the specific events they 
consider because they send a more general 
signal about how the Court is likely to de-
cide on matters of peace and justice.
Third, diplomatic threats to prosecute 
specific individuals for war crimes may 
be paired with promises, should behavior 
change. This could be useful during vio-
lent conflict situations. Arrest warrants 
lack the flexibility of diplomacy and nar-
row the scope for bargaining, thereby re-
moving the incentive that perpetrators of 
atrocities have to cooperate. Little if any 
precedent exists to suggest these provide 
a constructive way forward that meets a 
do-no-harm standard.
Existing debate about sequencing among 
practitioners of international justice have 
ultimately been inadequate, failing to pro-
vide a solution to some of the most intrac-
table peace and justice dilemmas. Instead, 
the international community, including 
the icc, should recognize the legitimacy 
of transitional justice compromises when 
they demonstrate a measure of domestic 
support that extends beyond those who di-
rectly benefit and especially when those 
most affected by violence support the deal. 
Innovative solutions designed to bridge 
a gap between accountability and impuni-
ty and hold off icc investigations not only 
face external scrutiny, but they may also 
struggle to survive the political maelstrom 
of electoral democracy. On September 24, 
2015, President Santos of Colombia and 
the farc rebel leader Timoleón Jiménez 
announced a major breakthrough in peace 
talks that sought to bring an end to a fifty- 
year-old conflict.34 After three years of 
talks, a solution to one of the most sensi-
tive issues, whether rebel fighters would 
face trial or receive an amnesty for their 
violent crimes, was agreed upon. Colom-
bia had been under preliminary examina-
tion by the International Criminal Court 
since 2006. Public opinion in Colombia, 
stoked by former President Uribe, also op-
posed a blanket amnesty. Negotiators an-
ticipated the public referendum and Co-
lombia’s Constitutional Court as two high-
ly consequential checks on a peace deal. 
They understood that the prospect of se-
curing a deal would plummet if they an-
nounced a blanket amnesty for the farc. 
Equally, a peace agreement with uncom-
promising justice for the farc stood lit-
tle chance of success. 
The deal that Colombia’s leaders sought 
to deliver reflected these conflicting pres-
sures, striking a cautious balance between 
peace and justice. It proposed a truth com-
mission for high-ranking individual per-
petrators. Those that confess their crimes 
were to receive alternative sentencing, in-
cluding tasks as varied as community ser-
vice or even academic study, while others 
would face full criminal trials. The deal was 
widely praised by international leaders. In 
2015, the icc issued a statement acknowl-
edging the deal and expressing its tentative 
support.35 Its reaction to Colombia’s deal 
reflected a heightened sensitivity to the pre-
carious balance between the requirements 
of peace and the demand for justice. As one 
Court official remarked, “we do not want to 
be seen to be a spoiler to peace.”36 
Despite widespread international sup-
port, the deal failed to survive, albeit by a 
narrow margin, in a public referendum. Hu-
man Rights Watch opposed the deal (as did 
a few notable individual human rights ad-
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vocates) and were quick to claim that the 
“no” vote was a vote against the transitional 
justice deal.37 And yet in those regions most 
affected by the violence, the public voted 
yes to peace, but turnout was low, in part 
because of the adverse conditions created 
by Hurricane Matthew. 
Transitional justice deals must satisfy 
belligerent parties, especially those with 
the power to spoil a deal, if they are to suc-
ceed. But the international community in-
creasingly plays an important role in stabi-
lizing these deals. Since 2002, the default 
position in the international community 
has been to assume that the rules for in-
ternational justice and, by default, the ex-
ceptions to those rules are governed by the 
International Criminal Court. Decisions 
about whether to acknowledge and ac-
cept these deals should be based on a cal-
culation of whether they are likely to stick, 
and also whether there is a broader basis 
for assuming the legitimacy of such deals. 
This decision should not be left solely in 
the hands of the icc, in part because the 
icc remains highly constrained by a fairly 
narrow set of rules for exercising this judg-
ment, but also because those rules remain 
vague, undefined, and, to a large extent, 
opaque.
The case of Colombia shows that tran-
sitional justice remains intensely politi-
cal. The prospect that an uncompromis-
ing peace deal will succeed is slight. But 
the decision to subject a negotiated deal to 
a public referendum laid bare the opportu-
nity for political elites to turn transition-
al justice into an instrument that could be 
used to gain advantage in electoral politics. 
The optimal mechanisms for evaluating the 
legitimacy of exceptions must extend be-
yond the consequentialist logic of political 
realists but not so far that it risks undermin-
ing the prospects for peace and for progress. 
It remains to be seen what criteria the 
icc will use to evaluate and decide on fu-
ture transitional justice deals. Technically, 
the icc decides on the basis of the princi-
ple of complementarity and also the inter-
est of justice, as mentioned in Article 53 of 
the Rome Statute.38 Complementarity, the 
principle that states that the icc will only 
take on cases that are not genuinely investi-
gated or prosecuted domestically, has now 
been interpreted as requiring that a state 
that wishes to pursue justice itself must 
hold criminal trials of individuals accused 
of international crimes, rather than seek-
ing any alternative form of accountability.39 
The interests of justice, the second pos-
sible avenue through which the icc can 
recognize the legitimacy of transitional 
justice deals, remains the subject of con-
tinued debate among transitional justice 
scholars and advocates primarily because 
it is not well defined or understood. The 
policy paper issued by the prosecutor’s of-
fice maintains that the interest of justice 
refers to the interests of victims, and that 
the interest of peace is not part of the in-
terests of justice but is the preserve of the 
Security Council. 
Formal arrangements for bringing perpe-
trators of mass atrocities to account have 
enshrined and protected the principle of 
accountability and yet, in practice, power-
ful spoilers continue to present an obsta-
cle to the realization of this principle. This 
has resulted in uncertainty and ambiguity 
about when the rules will be applied. And 
yet no revision to the current rules seems 
to be on the horizon. The referral of Lib-
ya to the International Criminal Court and 
the ensuing proximity between justice, hu-
manitarian intervention, regime change, 
and the Security Council created a water-
shed moment for proponents of interna-
tional justice, but the thinking it generat-
ed has not yet led to a new consensus on 
the role of justice in conflict and transition. 
The current framework for securing in-
ternational justice has proven inadequate. 
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It has gone a considerable distance to-
ward changing expectations, disseminat-
ing norms, and consolidating institutional 
frameworks for justice. But in the most in-
tractable cases of authoritarianism, conflict, 
and transition, there has been little justice. 
Where the icc has pressed ahead, this has 
inspired a concerted backlash. 
The structure of international justice 
has also inspired allegations of hypocrisy. 
Liberal democracies of the West remain 
beyond the purview of international jus-
tice, for the most part. Allegations of tor-
ture by U.S. officials have been investi-
gated but not prosecuted. The icc focus-
es disproportionately on Africa, while the 
scale of mass atrocities in Syria grows dai-
ly. Each of these individual critiques of jus-
tice can be answered, but taken together, 
the overall picture for international justice 
is dissatisfying. Two measures for build-
ing on existing institutions should be em-
braced: first, one that recognizes the le-
gitimacy of negotiated transitional justice 
compromises, especially in contexts where 
this is important for securing a democrat-
ic transition or strengthening the prospect 
for peace; and second, one that defers ar-
rest warrants for sitting heads of state un-
til a strategy for ending violent conflict 
has been implemented. The legitimacy of 
transitional justice compromises should 
be based on its overall benefit for society, 
and on evidence of domestic approval be-
yond a narrow self-interested elite, espe-
cially where this includes those most af-
fected by violence. 
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